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idence, on a motion first made after a verdict is taken, thus leaving the
federal courts free to conform to the prevailing state practice sanction-
ing such procedure. 14 On the other hand, if it is thought that the com-
mon law test of the meaning of the right hy trial by jury should be
retained, the Supreme Court might, under the recent congressional
grant of authority to make rules of procedure to govern the federal
courts in actions at law,' 5 promulgate a rule providing for reserved rul-
ings on motions during the trial, thus making available in all the federal
courts, 'irrespective of the practice of the state wherein sitting, the pro-
cedure for judgments non obstante veredicto, on the evidence approved
by the instant case.
KENNETH W. YOUNG.
Gaming-Conflict of Laws-Statutory Liability of Winner
for Penalties.
In Georgia there is a statute which authorizes the loser in a gambling
transaction to bring suit at any time within six months for the recovery
of the amount lost, and if he neglects to bring this action within the
allotted period any person may sue the winner and recover the amount
involved in the wager, one-half for himself and one-half for the county
educational fund.' With this statute as the basis of his action the plain-
tiff alleged that in 1930 the defendant entered into a gambling contract
in Fulton County, Georgia, with Lloyds Insurance Co. of London, Eng-
land, the forfeit to be $2500 in case "Bobby" Jones won the four major
golf championships during that year; that Jones won the four champion-
ships; that the money was paid; ahd that although six months had ex-
pired the loser had not brought suit to recover its loss. The appellate
court reversed the lower court's ruling which sustained the defendant's
demurrer on the ground that the allegation that the contract was made
in Georgia was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction.2
"'It has been -pointed out that such an interpretation is an unnecessary one:
Scheidt v. Dimick, 70 F. (2d) 558, 564 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934) (Mr. Justice Morton,
dissenting, said, "I do not think that the Constitution prohibits improvements in
the machinery for administering justice or restricts our procedural methods to
those in use in the days of hand looms and sailing ships.") ; Funk v. U. S., 290
U. S. 371, 384, 54 Sup. Ct. 212, 216, 78 L. ed. 369, 376 (1933) (Mr. Justice Suther-
land, speaking for the majority, said, "An adoption of the common law in general
terms does not require, without regard to local circumstances, an unqualified ap-
plication of all its rules; the rules have been controlling in this country only so
far as they are suited to and in harmony with the genius, spirit and objects of
American institutions; the rules of the common law considered proper in the
eighteenth century are not necessarily so considered in the twentieth.").
1148 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. A. §723b (1934 Supp.).
1 GA. CoD ANzr. (Michie, 1926) §4256.
2 Tatham v. Freeman, 180 S. E. 871 (Ga. 1935).
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The act involved in the principal case was adopted in 1765, and it
seems to have been derived from the English statute of 8 Anne, c. 14.s
Similar statutes, some of which authorize the informer to recover treble
the amount involved in the illegal transaction, have been enacted by
other American jurisdictions.4 Collusion between the informer and the
loser for the purpose of increasing the latter's recovery has been held
an adequate defense for the winner,5 and a fictitious suit between the
winner and the loser will not bar the informer's right of action.8 Where
the disabilities of married women have 'been removed, it is considered
proper for the wife of the loser to bring the action as informer.7 In
New York, however, the only persons competent to sue as informers are
those who are charged with the care of the poor in the community.
8
Usually the informer is required to divide his recovery with some county
agency.9 Further, as the chart will indicate, gambling is generally re-
garded as a criminal offense,10 and many states by statute authorize the
loser to recover his loss by means of a civil action against the winner. 1
The decision in the principal case is predicated upon a point of pro-
cedure, but the facts motivate an inquiry along different lines. Where
was this contract made-in England or in Georgia? Assuming that it.
was made in England where this type of betting is legal, could the
defendant be subjected to the penalties of this Georgia statute? From
the brief statement of facts it is impossible to determine whether the
defendant in Georgia made an offer to wager via the mails, by cable, or
through an agent, or whether he accepted the offer to wager on specified
terms which was circulated throughout the world by the insurance com-
pany. If the latter possibility were the fact the court might consider
the contract as made in Georgia, since the last act necessary to complete
it was performed there. Thus as the lex loci contractus would control,
'Neal v. Todd, 28 Ga. 334 (1859) ; Cole v. Applebury, 136 Mass. 525 (1884).
'For example, ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 38, §310.
'Kiser v. Walden, 198 I1. 274, 65 N. E. 116 (1902) ; Cole v. Applebury, 136
Mass. 525 (1884).
' Staninger v. Tabor, 103 Ill. App. 330 (1901).
"Johnson v. MdGregor, 157 Ill. 350, 41 N. E. 558 (1895). For cases decided
prior to the removal of the married women's disabilities, see Moore v. Settle, 82
Ky. 187 (1884) ; Spiller v. Close, 110 Me. 302, 86 Atl. 173 (1913).
1 CoNs. LAws OF N. Y. (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, §989.
'For example, ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 38, §310.
" For example, N. C. CODE (1935) §4430. At common law gambling was not
considered illegal. Ex parte Pierotte, 43 Nev. 243, 184 Pac. 209 (1919).
"For example, ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §43-102. In the absence of statute the
loser in a betting transaction cannot recover the money or property lost. F. M.
Davies Co. v. Porter, 248 F. 397 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918) ; Sofas v. McKee, 100 Conn.
541, 124 AtI. 380 (1924). In North Carolina even though we have one statute
which renders gambling illegal and another which declares all gambling contracts
to be void, it is impossible for the loser to recover the money or property lost at
gambling. Dunn v. Holloway, 16 N. C. 322 (1829).
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May the loser party recover What, if any, May theyif the loser Arecover re the witness claimrecoer t  filt  sr  gambling a  
money or fails to d id? criminal theprivilege
property lost? within the consequences against self




No Statute No Statute No Statute Fine--$100 No
Jail-90 days
Georgia's Yes. Statute of Yes. Statute of Yes Misdemeanor No
limitations is limitations is
6 months. 4 yrs. Recover
amount of loss.
Illinois" Yes. Stat. of limit. Yes. Recover Yes Fine No Statute
-6 mos. treble the $10 to $100
Minimum ain't: amount of loss.
$10.
Nevada's No Statute No Statute No Statute Felony No
one to five
yrs. in jail
North No Statute No Statute Yes Misdemeanor No
Carolina's
New YorkT Yes. Stat. of limit. Only those Yes Fine--Five No
-3 mos. charged with times ain't won
Minimum ain't: care of poor
$25. may sue. Treble
recovery.
Oregon's Yes. Loser may No Statute Yes Misdemeanor No
recover double Fine-$500
ain't lost.
Snuth Yes. Stat. of limit Yes. Recover Yes Fine--$100 No
Carolina's -3 mos. treble amount Jail-30 days
Minimum ain't: of loss.
$50.
Virginia's Yes. Stat of limit. No Statute Yes Fine-$100 No
-3 mo. Jail-60 days
Minimum ain't:
$5.
(The above states were selected for purposes of illustration. No complete survey was
intended.)
"CouP. LAWS OF FLA. (1927) §§7666, 7672, and 8311; ComP. LAWS OF FLA.
(Supp. 1934) §4151(74). Pari mutual betting is permitted at licensed tracks in
this state.
IGA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §§4256 and 4260; GA. PENAL CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1926) §392.
"AILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 38, §§298, 309, 310, and 316 (10). Pari
mutual betting is permitted at licensed tracks in this state.
'In Nevada certain types of gambling games may be played at licensed houses.
A violation of this law is a felony. However, the act specifically provides against
a construction making it illegal for persons to participate in social games for
drinks, smokes, or which involve prizes valued at two dollars or less. Pari mutual
betting at licensed tracks is permitted. NEv. Comp. LAWs (Hillyer, 1929) §§10201
and 10205.
IN. C. CODE (1935) §§2142, 2143, and 4430.
'Any person -who wins more than $25 by gambling during a 24 hour period is
subject to a fine of five times the amount won, which may be recovered in a civil
action by the persons charged with the care of the poor in the county 'Where the
offense occurred. A similar penalty may be applied where the winner has forced
the loser to pay his losses. Where the loser has neglected to exercise his privilege
of recovering those sums which he has lost at gambling, the persons charged with
the care of the poor may briiig a civil action against the winning gambler. If the
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the informer might properly sue under the Georgia statute. The prob-
lem is more difficult if the facts should indicate that the defendant made
an offer to bet which the insurance company accepted in England. In
several cases where money was transmitted by telegraph from one state
to another for placement as a wager the courts have held that the
transaction was completed in the state where the wager was accepted
and placed. Consequently if gambling was legal where the bet was
placed the gambler in the other state could not be penalized under its
laws even though gambling was considered illegal there.22 However,
these cases were expressly disapproved in Biscayne Kennel Club v. Tay-
lor2 3 where the owner of a Florida dog racing track sought an injunction
in the Federal District Court to restrain interference by local officers
with his scheme to receive wagers at the track and transmit them by
telegraph to Cuba for placement. The petition was denied upon the
ground that the plan entailed an obvious attempt to evade the state laws
prohibiting gambling. The Supreme Court of Kentucky employed sim-
ilar reasoning in Commonwealth v. Crass24 where the defendant's de-
murrer to the jurisdiction of the court was overruled and his conviction
for gambling sustained even though the facts indicated that he had
crossed into Tennessee to make the wager on an election. Further, the
dictates of public policy usually deny the enforcement of gambling con-
tracts by the courts of a state whose statutes frown upon the practice of
gaming even though it is agreed that the contract was made in a juris-
diction where gambling was legal.2 5
From these authorities it appears that the gambling transaction
which crosses a state line represents an exception to the theory of lex
loci contractus, and, as applied to the facts of the principal case, it would
seem that the plaintiff-informer could bring his action under the Georgia
action is brought under this theory the recovery is limited to treble the amount won.
CoNs. LAWs or N. Y. (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, §§989, 990, 992, 995, and 996.
ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §§14-739, 14-743, 43-101, and 43-102.
CoDE oF LAws OF S. C. (Michie, 1932) §§1738, 1744, 6308, 6309, 6311, and
6312.
'VA. CoDm ANN. (Michie, 1930) §§4686, 4780, 5558, and 5559.
' This type of statute usually provides that self-incrimination will not excuse
the witness and he is protected from prosecution by reason of any testimony
which he may give. For example, N. C. CoDE (1935) §2143.
1 McQuesten v. Steinmetz, 73 N. H. 9, 58 Atl. 876 (1904) ; Lescallett v. Com-
monwealth, 89 Va. 878, 17 S. E. 546 (1893). But cf. Ex parte Lacy, 93 Va. 159,
24 S. E. 930 (1896).
=23 F. (2d) 871 (S. D. Fla. 1927).
180 Ky. 794, 203 S. W. 708 (1918). Other cases in -point are: Brand v. Corn-
monwealth, 110 Ky. 980, 63 S. W. 31 (1901); Commonwealth v. Collins, 181 Ky.
319, 204 S. W. 74 (1918) ; Tarleton v. Baker, 18 Vt. 9, 44 Am. Dec. 358 (1843).
' Maxey v. Railey & Bros. Banking Co., 57 S. W. (2d) 1091 (Mo., 1933);
Gooch v. Faucett, 122 N. C. 270, 29 S. E. 362 (1898) ; Note (1928) 5 N. Y. U. L.
REv. 69.
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statute even though the contract were made in England. Certain steps
were taken by the defendant in Georgia which resulted in a violation of
the Georgia law. After all, these statutes providing punishments and
penalties for gambling were enacted for the purpose of stamping out
this vice, and in view of this policy, the law should not present the
opportunity of easy evasion which exists if the gambler is allowed to
escape merely because the bet was actually accepted in another state.
N. A. TOWNSEND, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Power to Regulate Taxicabs-
Requirement for Indemnity Bond.
A city was given power by its charter "to license and regulate all
vehicles operated for hire in the city." Held, the city was without
authority to require taxicab operators to provide liability insurance or
bond to protect the public against negligent operation of the cabs.1
In reaching this result the court based its decision on the principle
that a municipal corporation possesses only those powers expressly
granted, necessarily implied, or essential to its declared objects. 2 But
the great majority of courts, although reciting this formula, have reached
results contra to that of the instant case and have upheld similar ordi-
nances under grants of power no more extensive than that involved in
the principal case. Ordinances requiring indemnity bonds of taxicab
operators have been upheld under grants of power to "collect a license
tax on and regulate hacks,"3 "to regulate the use of streets, ' 4 "to reg-
ulate every description of carriages which may be kept for hire,"5 and
"to license, tax, and regulate public hackmen."'  In the light of these
decisions the court in the principal case seems to adopt an unnecessarily
I State v. Gulledge, 208 N. C. 204, 179 S. E. 883 (1935). The same ordinance
was before the court in State v. Saseen, 206 N. C. 644, 174 S. E. 142 (1934), and
was held invalid on constitutional grounds. For a comment attacking that decision
see (1935) 13 N. C. L. REv. 222. The constitutional objections were removed from
the ordinance before the instant case arose.
'Detroit Citizens Street Railway Co. v. Detroit Railway, 171 U. S. 48, 18 Sup.
Ct. 732, 43 L. ed. 67 (1897) ; Smith v. New Bern, 70 N. C. 14 (1874) ; 1 DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) §237.
'Ex parte Counts, 39 Nev. 61, 153 Pac. 93 (1915).
'City of New Orleans v. Le Blanc, 139 La. 113, 71 So. 248 (1915) ; Fenwick
v. City of Klamath Falls, 135 Or. 571, 297 Pac. 838 (1931) ; Greene v. City of
San Antonio, 178 S. W. 6 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Ex parte Sullivan, 77 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 72, 178 S. W. 537 (1915); Ex parte Bogle, 78 Tex. Crim. Rep. 1, 179
S. W. 1193 (1915) ; Note (1926) 25 MIcH. L. R-v. 81. In Ex parte Cardinal, 170
Cal. 519, 150 Pac. 348 (1915), an ordinance requiring indemnity bond of taxicab
operators was upheld under the city's implied -police power to regulate the streets;
the ordinance was described as being "purely regulatory in its nature."
IWillis v. City of Fort Smith, 121 Ark. 606, 182 S. W. 275 (1916) ; Common-
wealth v. Kelley, 229 Ky. 722, 17 S. W. (2d) 1017 (1929); Ex parte Dickey, 76
W. Va. 576,85 S. E. 781 (1915).
1 Sprout v. City of South Bend, 198 Ind. 563, 153 N. E. 504 (1926).
